JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. This paper reexamines whether higher cigarette taxes will substantially reduce youth smoking. We study the impact of taxes during exactly the period in adolescence in which most smokers start their habits. We find weak or nonexistent tax effects in models of the onset of smoking between eighth and twelfth grades, models of the onset of heavy smoking between eighth and twelfth grades, and discrete-time hazard models that include state fixed effects. We also provide a new perspective on the relationship between smoking and schooling: students who eventually drop out of school are already more likely to smoke in the eighth grade.
I. Introduction
Since the 1964 Surgeon General's report on the health consequences of smoking, the prevalence of smoking among adults has decreased from 40 percent to about 24 percent (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2000b) . However, over most of the 1990s the trend has been that more high school students are beginning to smoke. For ex-"protection of children constitutes the strongest argument favoring increased taxation of cigarettes."
This paper reexamines the empirical support for predictions that increases in cigarette taxes or prices will substantially reduce youth smoking. Part of the support for these predictions comes from evidence that higher taxes reduce aggregate tobacco sales and adult smoking, coupled with the argument that taxes will have a disproportionate impact on youth smoking (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1994b; Institute of Medicine 1998). But the tax responsiveness of adult and youth smoking depends on two distinct types of behavior. Very few people start smoking once they are over the age of 22.
1 Higher taxes reduce adult smoking and aggregate sales by encouraging current smokers to quit or cut down. However, higher taxes reduce youth smoking mainly by preventing them from starting. Taxes may have much different impacts on youth starting behavior than on adult quitting behavior. This paper explicitly focuses on the impact of taxes on the onset of smoking among youths.
We use a panel micro data set, the National Education Longitudinal Survey of 1988 (NELS:88), which spans a period in which many states increased taxes on cigarettes, to develop new price elasticity estimates. Our study exploits the fact that NELS:88 provides data on cigarette smoking by eighth graders, with follow-up surveys two and four years later. We are able to study the impact of taxes on smoking behavior during exactly the period in adolescence in which most smokers start their habits. In contrast, almost all previous studies rely on cross-sectional data, often collected from high school seniors or young adults several years after they started smoking.
After a brief background discussion in Section II, Section III discusses our data and empirical approach. Our strategy is first to estimate benchmark cross-sectional models on the basis of the NELS:88 data that can be directly compared to previous studies. Next, we improve on the benchmark models by exploiting the panel nature of the NELS:88 data to estimate the onset of smoking using a variety of empirical models. Empirical results on the effects of taxes on the onset of smoking are presented in Sections IV and V. The role of school performance and other important determinants of the onset of smoking are discussed in Section VI. Section VII presents conclusions. 1 For example, data from the 1991 NHSDA show that of adults who had ever smoked daily, 89 percent had first tried a cigarette before the age of 18 and 71.2 percent had begun smoking daily by the age of 18 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1994b, p. 67 
II. Background
Empirical studies provide compelling evidence that consumer decisions about cigarette consumption obey the "law of demand": when prices of cigarettes go up, the amount consumed falls. Cigarette demand functions have been estimated using different types of data and measures of consumption: time-series data on national aggregate consumption, pooled time series of state cross sections, and micro-level data on consumption from surveys of individuals. Reviews of this literature by Manning et al. (1991, app. A) , Viscusi (1992) , and Chaloupka and Warner (2000) provide a basis for a consensus that the price elasticity of cigarette demand is probably around Ϫ0.3 to Ϫ0.5. It is important to note that adults consume 98 percent of all cigarettes in the United States (Congressional Budget Office 1998), so the aggregate data on cigarette consumption are dominated by adult smoking. In addition, most of the micro data sets used to date include many more adults than youths or exclude youths entirely. Consequently, the consensus on the price elasticity of the demand for cigarettes should be interpreted as reflecting the price-consumption relationship for adults. A common argument is that youth smoking will be even more priceresponsive than adult smoking. However, theoretical economic models suggest a number of interacting and offsetting influences that mean youth smoking may be either more or less price-responsive than adult smoking. For example, the influence of the income effect of a price change on youth versus adult smoking is ambiguous because it is not clear if cigarettes are a normal or an inferior good. Youths may be less addicted to cigarettes than adults, which intuitively suggests that youth demand will be more price-elastic. In the rational addiction model, however, current and future consumption are complementary goods, so nonaddicts respond less to long-run permanent price changes than addicts will (Becker, Grossman, and Murphy 1991) . This suggests that youth demand may be less elastic than adult demand. It has also been argued that the role of peer influences makes youth smoking more responsive to higher prices (Lewit, Coate, and Grossman 1981) , but the prediction is once again not straightforward and depends on whether peer influences lead to "bandwagon effects" or "snob effects" (Leibenstein 1950) . DeCicca, Kenkel, and Mathios (2000) and Kenkel and Mathios (2000) suggest that youth demand for cigarettes is largely derived from the demand for peer acceptance. This has complex implications for the degree of price responsiveness. For example, if youths have limited or no ability to substitute other inputs for cigarettes in the production of peer acceptance and if the cost of cigarettes is a relatively small share of the total cost of producing peer acceptance, the derived demand for cigarettes will be relatively inelastic with respect to the price of cigarettes.
The upshot of the various conceptual analyses is that the relative magnitude of the price responsiveness of cigarette demand by adults and youths remains an empirical question. But the empirical evidence is also mixed. The majority of studies generally lend empirical support to the notion that youth smoking is at least as price-responsive as adult smoking (Lewit, Coate, and Grossman 1981; Lewit and Coate 1982; Chaloupka and Grossman 1996; Chaloupka and Wechsler 1997; Lewit et al. 1997; Centers for Disease Control 1998; Evans and Farrelly 1998; Evans and Huang 1998; Chaloupka and Pacula 1999; Harris and Chan 1999; Gruber 2000) . However, the results are more mixed for subgroups, with some estimates suggesting a low or nonexistent price responsiveness among adolescent girls (Lewit et al. 1997) , white youths (Centers for Disease Control 1998; DeCicca et al. 2000) , and younger teens (Gruber 2000) . Moreover, a number of studies suggest more generally that youth smoking may not respond to price at all (Chaloupka 1991; Wasserman et al. 1991; Douglas and Hariharan 1994; Douglas 1998 ). The recent Surgeon General's report on smoking (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2000) concludes that there is a need for additional research on this issue. For additional reviews, see Chaloupka and Warner (2000) and Kenkel and Mathios (2000) .
Most previous studies of youth smoking share in common a specification problem and several data problems. In the standard specification, current smoking participation is modeled as a function of current taxes or prices.
2 Because of addiction, current smoking reflects a sequence of starting and quitting decisions in past periods, with starting behavior a much more important part of youth behavior than quitting. That is, smoking participation among 18-year-olds is the cumulated hazard of starting to smoke at age 12, age 13, and so on multiplied by the probabilities of not quitting each year. The standard specification implicitly models all these decisions as depending on the tax or price the youth faces when surveyed in the cross section (often at the age of 18). With cross-sectional data that include only measures of current smoking, it is impossible to match smoking decisions to the taxes faced at the time of the decisions.
Another limitation is that the cross-sectional variation that identifies youth price responses is due mainly to different state excise taxes on cigarettes. If taxes are correlated with other tobacco control measures and antismoking sentiment at the state level, studies that rely on this source of variation may yield biased estimates of the price responsiveness of youth smoking.
3 Common data sets used in previous studies, such as the MTF, also contain only rather sparse sets of control variables, leaving important aspects of family background and school environment unmeasured. In addition, school-based studies such as the MTF neglect the smoking behavior of high school dropouts. The YRBS shows dramatic differences in smoking behavior by dropout status: about onethird of out-of-school youths report smoking cigarettes during the 30 days preceding the survey, compared to only one-fifth of in-school youths (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1994a). Clearly, including dropouts is of fundamental importance in understanding youth smoking behavior.
III. Data and Empirical Approach
The main objective of our study is to use cross-sectional and panel data from the NELS:88 survey to examine the responsiveness of youth cigarette consumption to cigarette taxes and other socioeconomic factors. The longitudinal data allow us to estimate the onset of youth smoking as a function of taxes faced at the time the decision is being made, thus avoiding the specification problem in most previous studies. Following a description of the NELS:88 data set, we describe the alternative econometric specifications to be estimated: (i) cross-sectional demand functions with contemporaneous taxes and (ii) smoking onset functions.
Data
The National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 is a large-scale study that provides a variety of data regarding American eighth graders as they move through the school system and into early adulthood. The study administered questionnaires and subject-specific achievement tests to 24,599 eighth graders in more than 1,000 public and private schools in the spring of 1988. At that time, data were also collected from the student respondents' parents, teachers, and school principals. These data take the form of separate files that allow researchers to merge relevant information to any given student in the main file of the study. Students are from diverse racial, sex, and ethnic backgrounds, with oversampling of certain groups.
The NELS:88 continued with a second collection of information from these students in the spring of 1990, when most were high school sophomores, as well as a third collection when most were seniors. By design, NELS:88 staff resampled a subset of 21,474 members of the original eighth grade (1988) sample. Of the potential resample, 17,424 or 81.1 percent were successfully reinterviewed in 1990. In 1992, 16,489 individuals or 94.6 percent of those in both the eighth (1988) and tenth grade (1990) surveys were successfully reinterviewed. This last number represents the potential sample of students available in all three surveys. We focus on this group for several reasons. Most obviously, it allows us to study smoking onset. In addition, as described below in more detail, it allows us to measure eventual school dropout status. Finally, by focusing on individuals present in all three cross sections, we estimate the cross-sectional models and the smoking onset model on about the same samples, allowing more direct comparisons.
There are several additional sample restrictions that vary somewhat year by year. When the twelfth grade survey is used to illustrate these restrictions, restricting the sample to those to whom we can assign state of residence reduces the sample to 16,047. Further restricting the sample to those with smoking information yields 15,108 individuals. Additional restrictions due to missing data on other control variables reduce our twelfth grade cross-sectional sample to 12,889 individuals, so we use about 85 percent of the potential sample with information on smoking and state residence. 4 Somewhat larger samples are available for the eighth and tenth grade cross sections, because there was less missing information on smoking. The maximum available sample for the onset model ( ) is smaller, both because eighth grade smokers are N p 13,989 dropped and because it requires that smoking and state residence information is available for the same individuals in both eighth and twelfth grades. In the onset models, 1,900 observations (14 percent) are dropped because of missing values on control variables. In an additional 4 We exploit information in different data files of the NELS:88 data set to fill in missing information where possible. Missing information is mainly an issue for family background variables, such as family income, family structure, parental education and occupation, and so on. For most students, these variables are measured as of the eighth grade survey year (1988) using responses to the student questionnaires. Many of these same questions were also included in the parent questionnaires in 1988 and were repeated in the twelfth grade (1992) student questionnaires. While there is more family income information missing in the twelfth grade student file than in the eighth grade file, some of the students who failed to provide the information in eighth grade did so in twelfth grade. We therefore use information from these other data files to fill in the missing information in the eighth grade student file. For some measures, such as number of older siblings or parental education, the date of measurement (eighth or twelfth grade) is unlikely to be relevant. For other variables, notably family income, we are essentially using the family income category when the student was in twelfth grade to proxy for the family income category when the student was in eighth grade. set of results, these observations are retained by using conditional mean imputation to fill in the missing information.
Econometric Specifications and the Dependent and Independent Variables
In the first step of our analysis, we estimate benchmark models that can be directly compared to previous econometric studies of the price elasticity of adult and youth smoking. In these models the three years of data from NELS:88 are treated as three separate cross sections. We then turn to alternative specifications that focus on the determinants of the onset of smoking. As indicated in the Introduction, a large number of students begin to smoke between eighth and twelfth grades. In the first empirical model to investigate the onset of smoking, we limit our sample to those who are not smoking in the eighth grade (almost 95 percent of the available sample). The onset of smoking is then modeled in a parallel fashion to the cross-sectional models. Subsequent specifications explore the impact of past and current taxes on smoking onset, the determinants of the onset of heavy smoking, and discrete-time hazard models of smoking onset. The dependent variables for the empirical models of youth smoking are based on the responses to the following question: How many cigarettes do you currently smoke in a day? The possible response categories were 0, 1-5, 6-10, 11-40, and 40 or more.
5 The responses to this question are treated as a categorical variable in an ordered response model (ordered probit). Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for this and the other main variables used in the analysis. On the basis of this measure, the prevalence of smoking increases from about 5 percent in eighth grade to 17 percent in tenth grade to 24 percent in twelfth grade. The measure tends to capture somewhat regular smoking, because youths who smoke experimentally or occasionally may answer that they currently smoke zero cigarettes in a day. Data from the 1991 MTF survey (the earliest MTF data that include eighth and tenth graders) show that higher proportions of youths report any smoking in the past 30 days: 14 percent of eighth graders, 21 percent of tenth graders, and 28 percent of twelfth graders. Responses to another MTF survey question show comparable or somewhat lower proportions reporting daily smoking (7 percent, 13 percent, and 19 percent, respectively).
The first main focus of this study is the effect of cigarette taxes on smoking and smoking onset. With restricted use data (attained through special licensure with the National Center for Education Statistics) we We use nominal taxes and do not adjust for inflation. In the cross-sectional models and the onset models, adjusting for national inflation scales all state tax rates equally and so will have no meaningful effect on the estimated parameter on the tax variable. It might be more important to adjust for differential inflation rates across states. However, to the extent that state-specific cost of living indices are unreliable, making this adjustment will introduce more noise than information about relative prices. In the discrete-time hazard models, taxes are time-varying, and so we adjust them for national inflation. When states changed tax rates during the year, we used the tax rate in effect in the month preceding the interview date of each respondent.
7
In another set of models (not reported, but the results are available on request), taxes are replaced with cigarette prices. In all models, since youths residing in the same state are assigned identical taxes or prices, we utilize a robust estimation technique that accounts for the potential state-level clustering of the errors. A potential problem with our measures is that residents of states with high cigarette excise taxes may be able to purchase cigarettes from nearby states with lower tax rates (Saba et al. 1995) . If this avenue is open to youths, our estimated elasticities will be biased toward zero. Although cross-border purchases of cigarettes appear to be significant for adults, they should be much less common for youths, many of whom will not be licensed drivers, have access to a car, or make regular trips out of state. The empirical results of Lewit, Coate, and Grossman (1981) lend additional support to the argument that border crossing can be neglected when estimating demand for youth smoking.
To attempt to capture differences in antismoking policies and sentiment across states, we include a set of three measures of smokingrelated state legislation as explanatory variables in the smoking demand functions. These variables are based on information from Jacobson and Wasserman (1997) . The first is an index of restrictions specific to youth smoking, including limitations on cigarette vending machines and licensing requirements for cigarette vendors. The second is an index of restrictions on smoking in public places such as workplaces and restaurants. The third variable indicates whether the state had passed a "smoker's rights law," that is, legislation banning discrimination against smokers. Similar measures have been used in a number of previous studies (e.g., Wasserman et al. 1991; Chaloupka and Grossman 1996) , but the variables are admittedly imperfect measures of tobacco control policies. For example, they do not reflect the level of enforcement of the laws, and somewhat arbitrary assumptions are required to create the index variables. Even though they are imperfect measures of policies, these variables also help control for differences in antismoking sentiment across states. To the extent that the same states that impose lower than average taxes are also unwilling to pass tough tobacco control measures, failing to control for the effects of other tobacco control measures will lead to biased estimates of the effect of higher taxes. As an example of this phenomenon, during the 1980s, tobacco-producing 7 The data include only the interview month for each respondent in 1990 and 1992. For the 1988 wave, we assigned the tax rate in effect during the spring months in which NELS:88 was mainly conducted, although some respondents may have been surveyed over the summer. This should lead to very few incorrect assignments of taxes because only Rhode Island increased its tax rate over the summer of 1988. Wasserman et al. (1991) report that estimates of the price responsiveness of adult smoking are sensitive to the inclusion of an index of state smoking regulations, and they argue that including the index helps reduce omitted variable bias due to unobserved differences in antismoking sentiment. As an alternative approach to control for unobserved antismoking sentiment, in Section V we use state fixed effects in a discrete-time hazard model. A second goal of our study is to explore the relationship between schooling and smoking. To accomplish this, the cross-sectional demand functions include variables that control for high school dropout status. Because this is a unique aspect of the NELS:88 data, it is useful to describe how high school dropouts were followed. First, NELS:88 staff contacted the sampled schools to verify the enrollment status of every original sample member. If the school identified a student as having dropped out, NELS:88 staff attempted to confirm this information directly with the sample member. If the sample member could not be contacted, staff attempted to corroborate this information with an adult member of the sampled student's household. When successful in reaching these dropouts, staff administered dropout questionnaires and cognitive tests during off-campus administrative sessions. Dropouts attending these sessions were reimbursed for travel expenses at the end of the sessions. Overall, 88 percent of those identified as dropouts completed a questionnaire, providing well over a thousand observations on high school dropouts.
The panel nature of the data allows us to specify equations that help disentangle whether being a high school dropout leads to higher propensities to smoke or whether instead unobserved heterogeneity is responsible for the strong correlation between dropout status and cigarette consumption. To disentangle these effects, the equation for eighth graders (eq. 3) includes a dummy variable for whether the individual eventually drops out of high school. Since none of the students in eighth grade have, as yet, dropped out of high school, being a dropout cannot contribute to these smoking propensities. Similarly, the equation for tenth graders (eq. 2) includes a variable indicating whether the individual had already dropped out of high school and another indicating whether he or she will eventually drop out. For obvious reasons, the equation for twelfth graders (eq. 1) controls only for whether the individual is a high school dropout.
One of the major advantages of the NELS:88 data is the availability of a rich set of measures of socioeconomic status, school, and parent characteristics. Student control variables include race, sex, rural residence, region, family size, religion, and academic achievement scores. Note.-t-values appear in parentheses under estimated coefficients. To control for other factors in a very flexible manner, all models also include three dummy variables for region, a dummy variable for suburb, a dummy variable for rural, a dummy variable for Catholic, a dummy variable for Protestant, three dummy variables for birth year, 14 dummy variables for family income, seven dummy variables for mother's education, seven dummy variables for father's education, four dummy variables for mother's occupation, four dummy variables for father's occupation, six dummy variables for family size, six dummy variables for the number of older siblings, and five dummy variables for family composition. Results for these variables are not presented but are available on request Parent control variables include educational attainment of both parents, occupation, family income, and marital status. In most cases the student and parent control variables are measured when the student was in eighth grade (but see n. 4 above). Table 2 provides the results from the benchmark models of youth smoking behavior estimated for the eighth, tenth, and twelfth grade cross sections. These cross sections are treated separately so that the coefficients on the right-hand-side variables are not restricted to be the same in each year. In the models that include eighth grade smokers, cigarette taxes have negative and statistically significant effects on cigarette consumption in the eighth, tenth, and twelfth grade cross sections. The results (available on request) are similar when cigarette prices are used Chaloupka and Grossman's (1996) model predicts that a $0.20 tax increase would cause smoking participation rates to drop by 1.2 percentage points.
IV. The Impact of Taxes on the Use and Onset of Use of Cigarettes
9 Another way to illustrate the size of the tax effects is to calculate the price elasticities of smoking participation implied by the results. We first compute tax elasticities of smoking participation as the percentage change in the predicted probability that an individual smokes associated with a $0.20 increase in the cigarette tax. If taxes are passed through to prices at a rate a, the relationship between the tax elasticity, h tax , and the price elasticity, h price , is given by With for the
price tax eighth grade cross section the elasticity over a $0.20 tax increase is Ϫ2.03. Over this same tax increase, the implied elasticities from the tenth and twelfth grade cross sections are Ϫ1.31 and Ϫ0.72, respectively, comparable to but somewhat larger than many previous estimates. Table 2 also includes the first specifications that are models of smoking onset. In the standard specification used in the benchmark models, smoking decisions in the tenth and twelfth grades are modeled as functions of current taxes, even though some of the sample made the decision to start smoking in the eighth grade. Dropping eighth grade smokers from the tenth and twelfth grade cross sections converts these into models of the onset of smoking between eighth and tenth and eighth and twelfth grades, respectively. As can be seen in table 2, the estimated impact of taxes on smoking onset between eighth and tenth grades is substantially smaller than the estimated impact of taxes on the use of cigarettes in tenth grade; the implied price elasticity falls from Ϫ1.3 to Ϫ0.9. The estimated impact of taxes on smoking onset between eighth and twelfth grades is small and statistically insignificantly different from zero (and the implied price elasticity falls from Ϫ0.72 to Ϫ0.46).
8 The first step is to calculate the predicted probability that each individual in the sample smokes, F i , given by where F is the cumulative distribution function for the F(m Ϫ X b), i standard normal, m is the estimated first threshold in the ordered probit models, X i is a vector of the individual's values for the explanatory variables, and b is the vector of estimated slope parameters. The averages of F i in the samples are used as the predictions of baseline smoking participation rates. To predict the impact of tax increases, the next step recalculates F i , replacing each individual's observed tax rate with the observed tax rate plus $0.20. Averaging the recalculated F i 's provides the predicted smoking participation rates after the tax increase. 9 Instead of calculating F i for each individual in Chaloupka and Grossman's sample, we calculated F(Xb) to be 0.23 at the sample mean values for the vector of X variables to predict smoking participation at baseline. This compares to the sample proportion of 0.229 reported by Chaloupka and Grossman. Replacing the average price with the average price plus $0.20 yields a predicted smoking participation rate of 0.218. Note.-t-values appear in parentheses under estimated coefficients. The sample size of 12,089 in cols. 1 and 2 differs from the sample size in col. 5 of table 2 because there are 173 observations with twelfth grade smoking information but missing eighth grade smoking information. To control for other factors in a very flexible manner, all models also include three dummy variables for region, a dummy variable for suburb, a dummy variable for rural, a dummy variable for Catholic, a dummy variable for Protestant, three dummy variables for birth year, 14 dummy variables for family income, seven dummy variables for mother's education, seven dummy variables for father's education, four dummy variables for mother's occupation, four dummy variables for father's occupation, six dummy variables for family size, six dummy variables for the number of older siblings, and five dummy variables for family composition. Results for these variables are not presented but are available on request.
Dropping eighth grade smokers is a step toward the correct specification, but the onset of smoking between eighth and twelfth grades is still modeled as a function of taxes faced in twelfth grade. Table 3 presents preferred specifications of smoking onset that both drop eighth grade smokers and address the timing of taxes. The first specification models the onset of smoking as a function of the change in taxes between eighth and twelfth grades. The second specification models smoking onset as a function of both the level of eighth grade taxes and the change in taxes.
10 Table 3 also presents results from another set of models, where we expand the sample of analysis by using conditional mean imputation to fill in information for observations with missing values for control variables. 11 In all the models reported in table 3, the results show statistically insignificant effects of taxes on the onset of youth smoking. In models reported in an appendix table (available on request), the estimated effects of prices instead of taxes remain statistically insignificant and are even smaller in magnitude. Table 4 explores the impact of taxes on the onset of heavy smoking. The results of the onset models may be misleading if tax increases have different impacts on the onset of light versus heavy smoking. The onset of light smoking may not respond much to higher taxes because light smokers' cigarette expenditures are low; in fact, about 75 percent of occasional and light smokers "borrow" most of the cigarettes they smoke from friends (Emery et al. 1998 ). In addition, the onset of heavy smoking is arguably the most policy-relevant outcome because of the addiction and health consequences. To explore this issue, we redefine the dependent variable to measure the transition from no smoking in eighth grade into heavy smoking (more than one-half a pack a day) by twelfth grade. This different definition of smoking onset treats light and moderate smokers in twelfth grade as nonsmokers, so a probit model replaces the ordered probit model. The results presented in table 4 show that taxes are not important determinants of the onset of heavy smoking. The estimated coefficients are small, positive, and statistically insignificant.
To sum up, the results from several alternative specifications suggest that cigarette taxes are not strongly related to the onset of smoking between eighth and twelfth grades. This is especially notable because when the same data are used to estimate the standard cross-sectional specification, the results are similar to those of other studies and suggest that cigarette taxes are important. We argue above that the standard cross-sectional approach is misspecified because it models decisions about smoking that occurred over a number of past years as a function of current taxes. Consistent with this argument, only the estimated tax effects are sensitive to the respecification that models the onset of smoking by excluding eighth grade smokers and addresses the tax timing issue. Estimates of the influence of the other determinants of smoking behavior are very similar in the onset and the cross-sectional models.
11 An earlier version of this paper was criticized for its treatment of observations with missing values on control variables (Dee and Evans 1998) . In response, we revised the methods used to construct the data set, substantially reducing the number of observations with missing values. By conditional mean imputation we expand the sample to 13,989 observations, compared to the 14,095 observations used by Dee and Evans. It should be noted that the standard errors have not been corrected to account for the variance introduced by the conditional mean imputation. For additional discussion, see DeCicca et al. (1998 Note.-t-values appear in parentheses under estimated coefficients. To control for other factors in a very flexible manner, all models also include three dummy variables for region, a dummy variable for suburb, a dummy variable for rural, a dummy variable for Catholic, a dummy variable for Protestant, three dummy variables for birth year, 14 dummy variables for family income, seven dummy variables for mother's education, seven dummy variables for father's education, four dummy variables for mother's occupation, four dummy variables for father's occupation, six dummy variables for family size, six dummy variables for the number of older siblings, and five dummy variables for family composition. Results for these variables are not presented but are available on request.
The other determinants of smoking behavior included in the models do not vary over time, so it makes sense that the estimates of their effects are not sensitive to the timing issues.
V. Reconciling the Results: Additional Evidence

The Role of Unobservable Heterogeneity
Why does the incorrect cross-sectional specification yield strong tax effects that disappear in the onset models? The difference between the onset and cross-sectional results could be due to unobservable heterogeneity across states, which results in biased estimates of tax responsiveness in the cross-sectional models. For example, cigarette taxes may be high in states with strong antismoking sentiment, so the estimated effects of taxes reflect the influence of antismoking sentiment on youth smoking decisions. If decisions about early onset of smoking are particularly influenced by cultural attitudes toward smoking, eliminating the eighth grade smokers from our sample reduces this source of bias.
To explore whether unobservable heterogeneity is the likely explanation, we utilize several approaches. To begin to explore this explanation, we examine students in the NELS:88 data set from the three major tobacco-producing states, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Virginia, where there may be less stigma attached to smoking. Cummings et al. (1991) report the results of surveys of public attitudes about tobacco control policies conducted in 10 U.S. communities in 1989. Respondents from Raleigh, North Carolina-the only community sampled in a tobacco-producing state-were much less likely to favor regulating minors' access to tobacco or to favor regulating advertising, promotion, and sale of tobacco products generally. North Carolina and the other tobacco-producing states also tax tobacco at the lowest rates in the nation. Students residing in the three major tobaccoproducing states account for 7 percent of our eighth grade sample but 11.8 percent of the eighth grade smokers. This provides suggestive evidence that eighth grade smokers come disproportionately from states in which smoking is viewed more favorably and taxes are low, suggesting that their inclusion in the twelfth grade cross section biases estimates of tax effects away from zero.
Moreover, the estimated tax effects in the cross-sectional models are sensitive to restricting the samples to students not in the three major tobacco-producing states. (Complete results are available on request.) For example, in the eighth grade model the estimated coefficient on taxes is reduced from Ϫ0.0099 to Ϫ0.0064 and loses statistical significance. The estimated effect of taxes in the tenth grade model is not sensitive to this sample restriction, and the estimated coefficient in the twelfth grade model falls somewhat from Ϫ0.0030 to Ϫ0.0023. This pattern is consistent with the argument that the eighth grade models are subject to more heterogeneity bias because early onset of smoking is particularly influenced by antismoking sentiment.
An alternative specification of the onset models (reported in an appendix available on request) provides additional evidence of the possible importance of heterogeneity across states. When the results reported in table 3 are compared to the appendix results, including the measures of smoking-related legislation substantially reduces the estimated effects of taxes on smoking onset. In addition, statistically significant results reported in table 3 indicate that smoking onset is higher in states that had passed "smoker's rights" legislation. The size of the effects is modest, corresponding to about a two-percentage-point higher rate of smoking onset in states with antidiscrimination legislation. The discrimination prohibited by this legislation involves actions such as basing employment decisions on tobacco use and so seems unlikely to be a very important direct influence on youth smoking. Under the assumption that states with the strongest antismoking sentiment were the least likely to pass these laws, these results are consistent with the argument that antismoking sentiment plays a role in youth smoking decisions.
Discrete-Time Hazard Model with State Fixed Effects
An alternative approach to examining onset behavior, and one that can be used to explicitly account for unobserved heterogeneity, is a discretetime hazard model. In this approach the sample consists of each individual who is at risk of the occurrence of the event at each point in time (Allison 1984) . In the NELS:88 sample, it is assumed that all eighth graders are assumed to be at risk of starting to smoke. Only about 5 percent actually started to smoke at this time, and these individuals are no longer at risk of starting to smoke after eighth grade. 12 All others are still at risk in the tenth grade and thus are included as another observation in the sample. Finally, all those who did not start to smoke in the tenth grade are still at risk in the twelfth grade and continue to contribute to the sample. At the end of each wave of data the risk set is diminished by the number who experienced the event during that period.
The dependent variable in this model is the hazard rate, which is the probability that an event will occur at a particular time to a particular individual, given that the individual is still at risk at that time. This probability is modeled as a probit, and the right-hand-side variables include cigarette tax rates (converted into constant dollars using the consumer price index) and the other variables used in the onset model, augmented by dummy variables that permit the hazard rate to change over time. This is especially important because of the large increase in the hazard rate that occurs between eighth and twelfth grades. These dummy variables can also be interacted with the tax variable to allow the impact of taxes on the hazard rate to vary by grade level.
The discrete-time hazard model has several advantages. First, there is no need to omit those eighth graders who are smoking in eighth grade.
13 Second, compared with the onset model, tenth grade information is utilized in estimation of onset behavior. Third, and most im-12 Quitting behavior is not considered in this model in part because it is such a rare event in the NELS:88 data. It is conceptually possible for an eighth grade smoker to quit by the tenth grade and be at risk again of starting to smoke in the twelfth grade.
13 Inclusion of eighth grade smokers reflects the hazard rate of smoking onset between some earlier grade and eighth grade. It should be noted that almost no one starts smoking before sixth grade. Note.-t-values appear in parentheses under estimated coefficients. To control for other factors in a very flexible manner, we include three region dummy variables (not included in the fixed-effects model), a dummy variable for suburb, a dummy variable for rural, a dummy variable for Catholic, a dummy variable for Protestant, three dummy variables for birth year, 14 dummy variables for family income, seven dummy variables for mother's education, seven dummy variables for father's education, four dummy variables for mother's occupation, four dummy variables for father's occupation, six dummy variables for family size, six dummy variables for the number of older siblings, and five dummy variables for family composition. Results for these variables are not presented but are available on request.
portant, having multiple observations on tax in the same state allows the use of state fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity. If cross-sectional variation in taxes reflects unobserved heterogeneity, the coefficients on taxes should change significantly once state fixed effects are included in the discrete-time hazard model.
The results of alternative specifications of the discrete-time hazard model are presented in table 5. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that relying on cross-sectional variation yields estimates of tax effects on youth smoking that are subject to heterogeneity bias and that in this data set this bias is most severe in the eighth grade cross section. When state fixed effects are not included in the hazard model, the coefficient on tax is negative and significant. The second specification includes interaction terms between the taxes and grade. The results tend to suggest that the negative relationship between taxes and the hazard of smoking is mainly due to the relationship between taxes and the eighth grade hazard rate. When state fixed effects are included, there is no evidence that taxes reduce the hazard of starting to smoke. In the model without interactions, the coefficient on cigarette taxes becomes positive and insignificant. Examining the results of the model with tax and grade interactions suggests that the inclusion of the state fixed effects has a large impact on the estimated relationship between taxes and the eighth grade hazard rate. These results must, however, be interpreted with caution since we measure taxes at only three different time periods within a state.
VI. Schooling and Other Nontax Determinants of Smoking
The estimated demand functions show many of the expected systematic relationships between individual characteristics and youth smoking. Of particular interest is the new evidence on smoking and schooling. As reported in tables 3 and 4, high school dropout status has a strong influence on the transition between eighth and twelfth grades into smoking and heavy smoking. Even more interesting, as reported in table 2, the coefficients on the dummy variable indicating that the student eventually drops out of school are large and statistically significant in both the eighth and tenth grade cross-section models. This suggests that in years before students actually drop out of high school, they already have significantly higher smoking propensities. One explanation is that the eventual dropout variable proxies for time preference: youths with high discount rates have higher propensities to smoke and to drop out. A similar explanation is that dropout and smoking propensities reflect an unobservable taste for deviant behavior. Of course, there may be other differences between students who drop out and students who remain in school. But the models control for many important factors, including the student's math/reading ability, parents' income and education, and whether there was a disruption in the family such as divorce. The strong impact of eventual dropout status even when such factors are controlled for reinforces the interpretation that it proxies for factors such as time preference or a taste for deviancy. A somewhat different explanation is that youths who anticipate dropping out plan different lifetime income and health trajectories and make their smoking decisions accordingly: the costs of smoking in high school are lower for these youths compared to youths who plan to make larger investments in education.
14 In terms of other determinants of youth smoking, the results show that students who score higher on standardized tests of math and reading ability have lower rates of smoking onset. One interpretation is that higher-ability students smoke less because they have a better understanding of the eventual health consequences (Kenkel 1991; Viscusi 1992) . Results for the complete list of explanatory variables (not reported but available on request) reveal additional interesting patterns. Students with more highly educated fathers and students from intact families are less likely to smoke. All these patterns suggest that it may be useful to think of families investing in "smoking prevention" as part of child quality or human capital, because these same factors are also important determinants of other aspects of child quality (Becker 1981) .
VII. Conclusions
In this paper we use a rich panel data set on adolescent smoking to develop new estimates of the likely impact of increases in cigarette excise taxes. Our strategy is to estimate models that are comparable to previous studies and then exploit the panel nature of the data. Treating the three waves of the NELS:88 survey as separate cross sections yields results that are strikingly similar to previous estimates. A suggested consensus estimate from previous studies is that the price elasticity of teen smoking participation is Ϫ0.7 (U.S. Treasury Department 1998); our twelfth grade cross-sectional model implies a price elasticity of Ϫ0.72. However, these results are based on a specification that ignores the fact that current smoking participation reflects past decisions to start smoking.
When we estimate models of smoking onset between eighth and twelfth grades, the results suggest that cigarette taxes and smoking onset are not strongly related. This conclusion is not based solely on statistical significance, but on the preponderance of various types of evidence presented in the paper, including the pattern of results across specifications. The evidence is consistent with the argument that unobservable heterogeneity across states in antismoking sentiment leads to a bias in cross-sectional models toward finding strong tax effects. McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) argue that empirical economists should pay less attention to statistical significance and pay serious attention to the following scientific question: How large is the estimated effect in terms of the present conversation? Our answer is that our results do not provide evidence that modest hikes in taxes or prices are likely to be very useful policies to reduce youth smoking.
Because large tax or price hikes are not observed in our data, it is problematic to use our results to predict the likely impact of the much larger increases that have been proposed and begun to be implemented. Shortly after the legal settlement was reached between the state attorneys general and the tobacco industry in 1998, the major manufacturers raised the wholesale price of cigarettes by $0.45 per pack. Several large states have also substantially increased cigarette taxes, with a $0.50 per pack increase in California (effective January 1, 1999), a $0.40 per pack increase in New Jersey (effective January 1, 1998), and a $0.55 per pack increase in New York (effective March 1, 2000) . Between 1997 and 1999, across all states the average retail price of cigarettes increased by about 50 percent, from $1.80 per pack to $2.70 per pack. 15 According to estimates from the MTF and the YRBS, over the same time period the prevalence of smoking among high school seniors either decreased slightly (from 36.5 to 34.6 percent in the MTF data) or increased slightly (from 39.6 to 42.8 percent in the YRBS data).
16 From 1999 to 2000, cigarette prices increased by another $0.40 per pack, and according to the MTF data, smoking among high school seniors declined to 31 percent. (The YRBS was not conducted during the year 2000.) Future econometric studies using data from this recent period will be very useful, and this fragmentary evidence is not a substitute for such analysis. However, it is worth noting that the observed changes in smoking rates are inconsistent with the much larger responses to price hikes predicted by our and other cross-sectional models. The benchmark price elasticity of Ϫ0.7 implies that after the 70 percent increase in price observed between 1997 and 2000, less than 20 percent of high school seniors should still smoke. The recent experience seems much more consistent with the results of our onset model, suggesting that price hikes are not a very effective tool to discourage youth smoking. Even the decrease in youth smoking observed between 1999 and 2000 in the MTF data might be better explained by several new antismoking media campaigns rather than the price increases.
In addition to the role of taxes, the NELS:88 data allow us to explore the influence of a rich variety of other factors on youth smoking. The results reported above suggest that students who drop out of high school 15 Data from the American Chamber of Commerce Research Association (Cost of Living Index, various years) were used to calculate the average price of cigarettes in each state. The national average price was then calculated as a population-weighted average of state average prices. Price data from the second quarter of the year were used to correspond with the timing of the MTF and YRBS surveys. Price data from Orzechowski and Walker (1999) , measured in November of each year, show similar trends.
16 Both surveys suggest somewhat larger decreases in the prevalence of smoking among younger high school students between 1997 and 1999. have higher smoking propensities years before they actually drop out. This suggests that dropout status per se may not be the cause of higher smoking rates among dropouts. Students who score poorly on standardized achievement tests are also more likely to smoke. More basic to the economic model of human behavior than the law of demand is the idea that consumers make choices by comparing the perceived marginal benefits with the perceived marginal costs of each decision. Given other important influences on the perceived marginal benefits and costs, the monetary price of cigarettes may play a relatively small role in youth smoking decisions. Summarizing research on psychosocial risk factors, the Surgeon General's report on preventing youth smoking concluded that the influence of peers plays a "powerful role," because "smoking initiation appears to be a component of peer associations and peer bonding in adolescence, as peer groups establish shared behaviors to differentiate themselves from other adolescents and from adults" (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1994b, p. 139) . On the basis of a comprehensive literature review, Tyas and Pederson (1998, p. 416 ) also conclude that "one of the most consistent findings in the literature is that of the social influence of peers and others on adolescent smoking." Our results on the importance of variables such as dropout status are consistent with strong peer influences on youth smoking behavior. If peer influences are the major determinant of youth smoking, then the demand for cigarettes can be viewed as derived from the demand for peer acceptance. This approach may help explain the strong brand preferences of youth smokers and why youth smoking behavior and brand preferences vary systematically with race/ethnicity (DeCicca et al. 2000; Kenkel and Mathios 2000) . Further evidence on the technology of producing peer acceptance is needed to develop predictions about the likely price responsiveness of the derived demand for cigarettes.
